How Two Lobbyists Command Policy Priorities of the Texas Legislature

Shadow Seeker

22 Jul 2025 • 17 min read

Allen Blakemore and Elliott Griffin operate at the nexus of Texas power, with Blakemore serving as Lt. Governor Dan Patrick's chief strategist and Griffin leveraging his past role as Patrick's External Affairs Director to influence policy as a lobbyist. Both simultaneously engage in lobbying for companies whose interests directly conflict with Patrick's public positions.¹

This investigation reveals how their dual roles as campaign consultants and registered lobbyists create a web of influence that may circumvent Texas's already weak corruption laws, while benefiting from policy positions that contradict overwhelming public support.

The scope of their combined influence extends far beyond traditional political consulting. Through his firm Blakemore & Associates, Blakemore has cultivated relationships with oil billionaires Tim Dunn and Farris Wilks, whose $100+ million political network, known as The Enterprise, has reshaped Texas Republican politics,² while Griffin’s firm, Griffin Communications, aligns with similar interests, further intertwining their operations with Patrick's legislative agenda—and its contradictions.

Political oligarchy fuels Texas Legislature influence machine

Tim Dunn and Farris Wilks have created what multiple sources describe as a "Russian-style oligarchy" in Texas politics, with politicians required to "kiss the ring or you're out."³

The Enterprise's political spending exceeds $100 million over the past decade, flowing through a network of PACs including the now-toxic Defend Texas Liberty and its replacement, Texans United for a Conservative Majority.⁴

The numbers reveal the influence scope of The Enterprise: Dunn has contributed over $29 million to Texas candidates and PACs since 2000, while Farris and Jo Ann Wilks have given over $16 million.⁵ Research indicates that 18 of the current 31 Republican Texas Senate members have taken money from The Enterprise, creating a legislative body beholden to two West Texas oil fortunes.⁶

Patrick sits at the center of The Enterprise. In June 2023, as he prepared to preside over Attorney General Ken Paxton's impeachment trial, Defend Texas Liberty gave Patrick $3 million in campaign funding—thirty times more than the PAC gave him in 2022.⁷ The timing was no coincidence; Patrick also received a $2 million forgivable loan from the PAC, financial arrangements that would later prove crucial to his political survival.

Allen Blakemore’s Grip on the Texas Legislature, Especially the Senate

Blakemore & Associates operates the political campaigns for at least 10 different candidates and officeholders, giving Allen Blakemore unprecedented control over Texas legislative operations.⁴⁶

Campaign finance records reveal that Blakemore's firm has received over $8.7 million in total payments from current and former legislators, creating a network of political dependency that extends far beyond traditional consulting relationships.

Among current Texas Senators, Blakemore runs the political operations for at least 8 members of the 31-seat chamber (26% of the Senate), including:

Lt. Governor Dan Patrick: $5,141,442.52
Donna Campbell: $481,144.85
Paul Bettencourt: $369,600.00
Pete Flores: $272,713.36
Brandon Creighton: $217,263.32
Lois Kolkhorst: $211,760.07
Joan Huffman: $26,273.04
Bob Hall: $17,854.55⁴⁶

The scope extends to House members, with Blakemore managing campaigns for two legislators, Tom Oliverson and Caroline Fairly.⁴⁶ This creates a situation where over one-quarter of the Texas Senate and House members depend on Blakemore for their political survival.

1. Run the campaign.
2. Serve as a “consultant”.
3. Get paid by companies as a lobbyist to “advise” officeholders on your best interest.

Texas government is for sale. Allen Blakemore gets rich off it. This ain’t Democrats. It’s Republicans selling your government. The… pic.twitter.com/DLWItakuYe
— Michael Berry (@MichaelBerrySho) June 28, 2025

When the same consultant who lobbies for specific corporate interests also controls the campaign operations for the legislators who vote on those interests, the potential for coordination becomes systematic rather than coincidental. Blakemore's clients aren't just paying for lobbying—they're paying someone who controls the political infrastructure of the officials making the decisions.

Blakemore's role as Patrick's senior strategist places him at the operational heart of The Enterprise policy vehicles. His firm has earned prestigious recognition, including a Pollie Award from the American Association of Political Consultants, while building what industry observers call one of the most effective political operations in Texas.⁸

The Gatekeeper to the Texas Senate

Via his political consulting firm Blakemore & Associates, has positioned himself as a critical gatekeeper for candidates aspiring to join the Texas Senate. A clear pattern emerges in the campaigns of candidates like Leigh Wambsganss and David Cook: to get into the Senate, it runs through Blakemore.

.@DavidCookTexas is in to succeed the retiring @SenatorBirdwell. Lt. Gov. @DanPatrick's consultant, Allen Blakemore, is his point of contact. #SD22 #txlege https://t.co/a0b1GG7uxp pic.twitter.com/yaNMpnK0VQ
— Renzo Downey (@RenzoDowney) June 30, 2025

Today I’m announcing my candidacy for Texas Senate District 9. More to come ... pic.twitter.com/y8OjY6eih4
— Leigh Wambsganss (@LeighForTexas) June 27, 2025

Allen Blakemore's firm not only manages their campaigns but also leverages a powerful network to secure immediate endorsements from influential figures like Lt. Governor Dan Patrick:

As President of the Texas Senate, I need Senators who have the experience to take on some of the most complex issues facing Texas today. Former Mayor, businessman, and State Representative @DavidCookTexas will have an impact on day one. He has my complete endorsement for Senate… pic.twitter.com/r8HNCT4qlI
— Dan Patrick (@DanPatrick) July 22, 2025

.@LeighForTexas has my total endorsement. She has been a leader of the conservative movement in Tarrant County and all of Texas. She will be a great addition to our conservative Texas Senate. #txlege pic.twitter.com/1ZupNbbbBG
— Dan Patrick (@DanPatrick) June 27, 2025

The Griffin House Empire: Extending Patrick's Control Across Both Chambers

Elliott Griffin represents a parallel influence operation that extends Patrick's consultant-lobbyist network beyond Blakemore's Senate focus, creating a complementary House-side empire that mirrors the same dual consultant-lobbyist model. Griffin served as Political Director for Patrick's successful 2014 campaign, then became External Affairs Director in Patrick's office from 2015-2018.⁹ After leaving Patrick's staff, Griffin immediately established Griffin Communications, positioning himself to lobby the same office where he previously worked while building a House-focused campaign consulting operation.

Griffin's path through Patrick's inner circle was more extensive than initially apparent. He served as Statewide Grassroots Director during Patrick's 2014 campaign, then Transition Director after the election, and finally External Affairs Director managing all stakeholder relations.²⁹ This progression gave Griffin unprecedented access to Patrick's decision-making processes and long-term strategic planning, creating the institutional knowledge necessary to operate effectively as both a lobbyist targeting Patrick's office and a campaign consultant building political dependencies among House members.

Griffin's family connections extend the influence of The Enterprise further through his father-in-law, Don Dyer, a prominent Austin entrepreneur and conservative activist. Dyer chairs the Texas Public Policy Foundation's 501(c)(4) advocacy affiliate and has contributed over $18,000 to Patrick's campaigns.³⁰ Critically, Dyer serves alongside Tim Dunn, who sits on TPPF's Board of Directors, creating a direct institutional link between Griffin's family and The Enterprise that funds Patrick's political empire.³¹

Griffin's Texas House influence machine mirrors Blakemore's Senate model

While Blakemore dominates Senate operations with 26% of the chamber, Griffin has built a parallel consultant-lobbyist empire focused on House members, creating a complementary influence network that extends Patrick's control across both legislative chambers. Campaign finance records reveal Griffin Communications has received over $47,000 from current and former Texas House members, establishing political dependencies that mirror Blakemore's Senate operations but target the lower chamber where most legislation originates.

Griffin's House client roster includes strategically positioned legislators:

Michael Olcott
Marc LaHood
Mark Dorazio
AJ Louderback
David L. Cook
Andy Hopper
Shelley Luther

Griffin's expanding House influence network gained another significant addition with his recent acquisition of Texas House member Briscoe Cain as a client.

Top right corner of the press release…more #txlege inside baseball intrigue 👀 https://t.co/ca8vkdAU8I
— Brad Johnson (@bradj_TX) June 27, 2025

This creates a House-Senate pincer movement where Patrick's influence extends through both Griffin's House clients and Blakemore's Senate network. When legislation moves between chambers, Patrick has consultant-clients positioned on both sides to coordinate outcomes that benefit their lobbying clients' interests. The strategic positioning allows Patrick to influence bills even when he cannot directly control House proceedings through his Senate presiding officer powers.

Cross-chamber coordination amplifies lobbying client benefits

Griffin's client roster strategically aligns with Patrick's legislative priorities: electricity/energy, healthcare, construction, telecommunications, transportation, and criminal justice.¹⁰ Most notably, Griffin positioned himself in the electricity/energy sector before the 2021 winter storm crisis elevated grid reliability as Patrick's top priority. Patrick's SB 6 ("Increasing Texas' Electric Grid Reliability") directly benefits natural gas companies and electricity generators—precisely Griffin's lobbying sectors.¹¹

The strategic positioning becomes evident in key policy areas where Griffin's electricity/energy lobbying clients benefit when his House campaign clients support grid reliability legislation that Patrick champions in the Senate. His healthcare lobbying work aligns with House members who depend on his campaign services, creating systematic coordination opportunities across both legislative chambers that benefit the same corporate interests paying for lobbying services.

Griffin's dual consultant-lobbyist role replicates Blakemore's conflict-of-interest model on the House side. While serving as campaign consultant for multiple House members, Griffin simultaneously lobbies those same legislators for corporate clients whose interests may conflict with constituent preferences. The campaign consulting creates dependencies that complement his lobbying relationships, establishing influence patterns identical to Blakemore's Senate operations but targeting the chamber where most bills originate.

Systematic influence coordination across both chambers

Most significantly, Griffin's House network allows Patrick to influence legislation even when he cannot directly control House proceedings. House bills that benefit Griffin's lobbying clients can receive support from Griffin's campaign clients, then advance to the Senate where Blakemore's client-legislators provide additional support. This two-chamber coordination system amplifies the influence of both consultants' corporate lobbying clients while maintaining plausible separation between campaign consulting and lobbying activities.

The sports betting contradiction reveals systemic conflicts

Patrick's opposition to sports betting legalization directly benefits his campaign consultant and former staffer's most lucrative clients.

Despite 60% of Texans supporting legalized sports betting—including 59% of Republicans—Patrick has blocked all legislative attempts at legalization, using his institutional power as Senate presiding officer to kill bills before they reach a vote.⁹

The financial arrangements tell the story. Both Blakemore and Griffin serve as registered lobbyists for three major companies in the Texas Sports Betting Alliance: DraftKings, FanDuel, and BetMGM. While these companies publicly support sports betting legalization, they currently operate profitable daily fantasy sports (DFS) contests in Texas without competition from sports betting operators.

"The Texas Senate doesn't pass bills with GOP in the minority," Patrick declared when blocking House Bill 1942 in 2023, despite the bill passing the House 82-51.¹² His spokesperson claimed they have "not spoken about online sports betting," but the structural conflict remains: Patrick's policy positions maintain a competitive advantage for his consultant and former staffer's clients.

This arrangement has concrete market implications. The University of Houston Hobby School poll found that 73% of Texans support destination resort casinos, yet Patrick's opposition protects the existing DFS market from expanded gambling competition.¹³ The companies paying Blakemore and Griffin to lobby for sports betting simultaneously benefit from their clients opposition to their own stated goals.

Medical marijuana lobbying creates parallel contradictions

While Patrick restricts THC access, Blakemore lobbies for medical marijuana expansion through Texans for Expanded Access to Medical Marijuana Inc. (TEAMM).

This organization, backed by Michigan-based Green Peak Innovations, commissioned polling showing 81% of Texas voters support medical marijuana expansion—yet Patrick pushed Senate Bill 3 in 2025 to ban all consumable THC products.¹⁴

The legislative dynamics reveal the influence network's complexity. When TEAMM's interests aligned with expanding the Texas Compassionate Use Program in 2019, Patrick allowed the bill to advance despite his historical opposition to marijuana reform. The legislation passed unanimously in the Senate, directly benefiting Blakemore's client interests.¹⁵

However, when Patrick later called Senate Bill 3 one of his "top five" bills in 17 years in the Legislature, he was targeting the broader hemp industry while potentially creating market advantages for medical cannabis operators like those backing TEAMM.¹⁶ Patrick's press conference included throwing THC products at reporters and asking if they were "crazy," but his consultant continued lobbying for expanded medical access.

The contradiction extends beyond policy positions. Research indicates that 82% of Texans support medical marijuana legalization, yet Patrick maintains restrictions that may benefit the specific medical cannabis companies paying his consultant.¹⁷ TEAMM emerged with what news reports called "players who have some serious clout in the Capitol—including Allen Blakemore, a top political consultant for Patrick."¹⁸

How THC restrictions create financial windfalls for Blakemore's clients

Patrick's push to ban hemp-derived THC products while expanding medical marijuana access represents a sophisticated market manipulation scheme that directly enriches Blakemore's lobbying clients.

The financial mechanics reveal why Patrick simultaneously restricts public access to THC while expanding the medical program his consultant's clients control.

Texas's hemp-derived THC market generates approximately $8 billion annually through 8,500+ retailers selling delta-8 and similar products with minimal state oversight.³⁴ Patrick's Senate Bill 3 would have eliminated this entire market, forcing all THC demand into the state-licensed medical program where Blakemore's clients hold exclusive positions.

TEAMM and its backers, including Michigan-based Green Peak Innovations, would benefit from this market consolidation in multiple ways:

License Scarcity Creates Artificial Value: Texas currently restricts medical marijuana to only 15 dispensing organizations statewide.³⁵ In limited-license markets, dispensary licenses trade for $1.5-2 million each, compared to $50,000 in open markets.³⁶ By eliminating the $8 billion hemp market, Patrick's restrictions would funnel all THC demand through these artificially scarce licenses.

Premium Pricing Without Competition: Medical marijuana products in Texas currently range from $4-80 per package with profit margins of 20-60%.³⁷ Eliminating hemp competition allows medical operators to maintain premium pricing without market pressure. Colorado saw medical marijuana prices drop 40% after recreational legalization created competition.³⁸

Expanded Patient Base Multiplies Revenue: House Bill 46's expansion of qualifying conditions—including chronic pain, the most common medical marijuana indication nationwide—could multiply the existing patient base while maintaining the closed-loop system.³⁹ With chronic pain affecting 20% of adults, this expansion represents millions of potential new patients.⁴⁰

TEAMM Leadership's Clients Directly Benefit: The organization's directors operate lobbying firms whose clients would profit significantly from THC restrictions:

Joe Neller (NPL Consulting) represents the American Telemedicine Association, Health-E Commerce, and the Pharmaceutical Research & Manufacturers of America (PhRMA).⁴⁴ By funneling all intoxicating-THC demand into the state-regulated medical program, these clients—particularly telemedicine providers and pharmaceutical companies—would capture significant patient consultations and prescription drug sales.
Thomas A. Forbes (Kemp Smith LLP) lobbies for the Texas Academy of Family Physicians, Texans for Expanded Access to Medical Marijuana Inc., and a major medical-marijuana company seeking market entry in Texas.⁴⁵ Eliminating consumer hemp-derived THC products and concentrating demand in the Compassionate Use Program would increase patient enrollment, prescription volumes, and premium pricing for both the physician group and licensed dispensary operators.

Regulatory Capture Revenue Streams: The medical-only system creates ongoing revenue for consultants and lawyers through regulatory compliance, licensing assistance, and legislative advocacy. Blakemore's contracts with TEAMM, valued between $50,000-100,000 annually, represent just the lobbying component of broader professional service relationships.⁴¹

The timing reveals the coordination: Patrick began pushing Senate Bill 3 to ban hemp THC in December 2024, the same period when House Bill 46 to expand medical marijuana was being drafted.⁴² His office coordinated both measures to eliminate competition while expanding the controlled medical market—exactly the outcome that maximizes value for Blakemore's medical marijuana clients.

Governor Abbott's veto of Senate Bill 3 in June 2025 disrupted this coordination, prompting Patrick to declare the medical marijuana expansion "worthless" since hemp competition would remain.⁴³ This reaction confirmed that Patrick's THC policy was designed not for public health, but to create market advantages for specific licensed operators—the same operators paying his consultant for lobbying services.

Texas Lottery controversy reveals strategic opportunity creation

Inside sources indicate that Patrick leveraged the Texas Lottery controversy to create bidding opportunities that could benefit Blakemore client Scientific Games Corp.

The timing and scope of Patrick's lottery investigations, while addressing legitimate regulatory violations, also positioned the state to potentially restructure lottery operations in ways that could advantage Blakemore's lobbying clients.

The lottery controversies provided substantial justification for intervention. Foreign syndicates gamed the system, including a New Jersey company that purchased 25.8 million tickets covering nearly every possible number combination to win a $95 million jackpot.¹⁹ Patrick's February 2025 investigations, including surprise visits to lottery retailers, addressed real violations of Texas law requiring in-person purchases.

However, Patrick's aggressive response went beyond simple enforcement. His public statements about "scandal-plagued" lottery operations and calls for comprehensive reform created political momentum for potentially restructuring vendor relationships, including the primary lottery operations contract held by International Game Technology (IGT) since 1992.²⁰

Scientific Games, which currently provides instant ticket printing services to Texas, could benefit from any expansion of competitive bidding for lottery operations.²¹ While IGT maintains its contract through 2034, Patrick's investigations created political justification for reviewing all lottery vendor relationships, potentially opening opportunities for companies like Scientific Games to expand their Texas operations beyond printing services.

The strategic nature of the timing suggests coordination between Patrick's political priorities and Blakemore's client interests. Senate Bill 28, banning courier services, passed unanimously with Patrick's strong support, while his broader lottery reform rhetoric created conditions for potential vendor contract reviews that could benefit the gaming companies paying his consultant for lobbying services.²²

Legal framework reveals enforcement weaknesses

Texas corruption laws contain significant gaps that make prosecution of political influence operations extremely difficult. The legal standard requires proving an "express agreement" between benefits and official actions, while the Texas Ethics Commission faces chronic enforcement problems that create a system of voluntary compliance.²³

Under Texas Government Code Chapter 305, lobbyists must register when receiving compensation exceeding $1,930 per quarter, with detailed reporting required for expenditures over $132.60.²⁴ However, enforcement data reveals systemic failures: only 7% of cases referred for prosecution since 2015 have been pursued, with 531 individuals owing over $800,000 in unpaid fines.²⁵

The dual consultant-lobbyist role that both Blakemore and Griffin maintain creates what ethics observers describe as "dining from both sides of the plate." Recent amendments restrict lobbyists from making political contributions from certain political funds, but coordination violations require proving undisclosed cooperation—difficult without internal communications.²⁶

Griffin's case presents particularly concerning revolving door dynamics. His extensive service in Patrick's administration—from campaign grassroots director to transition director to external affairs director—provided him with deep institutional knowledge of Patrick's policy processes. His immediate transition to lobbying, combined with his family's financial and institutional ties to The Enterprise that funds Patrick, creates multiple channels for potential coordination that may not appear in public disclosure records.

Griffin's sports betting clients (DraftKings, FanDuel, BetMGM) have directly benefitted by Patrick's opposition to legalizing sports betting, and maintaining the current regulatory status quo that protects daily fantasy sports from sports betting competition.³²

Bribery charges under Penal Code Section 36.02 carry 2-20 years imprisonment, but require demonstrating explicit quid pro quo agreements.²⁷ The express agreement standard makes political contribution cases nearly impossible to prosecute, even when patterns suggest systematic influence peddling.

Federal precedents from recent cases like Rep. Henry Cuellar's 2024 indictment for $600,000 in bribes show how consultant networks can facilitate corruption through money laundering conspiracies.²⁸ However, Texas state authorities have shown little appetite for aggressive prosecution of political influence operations.

Conflict of Interest as a Business Model

Both Blakemore's and Griffin's activities operate in the gray zone between legal political consulting and systematic influence peddling. While their dual roles as Patrick's campaign strategists and lobbyists for companies with interests directly affected by Patrick's decisions creates obvious conflicts of interest, proving criminal corruption under Texas law would require evidence of explicit agreements that rarely surface in public records.

The pattern reveals sophisticated influence operations that exploit weaknesses in Texas's regulatory framework. Public opinion consistently contradicts Patrick's positions—60% support sports betting, 82% support medical marijuana—yet policy outcomes align with both Blakemore's and Griffin's client interests. The THC restriction scheme particularly demonstrates this coordination: Patrick's simultaneous push to ban hemp products while expanding medical marijuana directly benefits Blakemore's clients by eliminating $8 billion in market competition while preserving artificial scarcity that makes medical licenses worth millions.

The financial scale amplifies concerns. The Enterprise's $100+ million in political spending, channeled through multiple PACs and flowing to candidates who hire consultants like Blakemore and Griffin, creates self-reinforcing influence cycles. When Patrick received $3 million from Defend Texas Liberty while presiding over Paxton's impeachment trial, it demonstrated how political and financial interests intertwine at the highest levels of Texas government.

The structural nature of these conflicts suggests institutionalized influence peddling rather than isolated ethical lapses. Both Blakemore and Griffin simultaneously shape Patrick's political strategy while lobbying for companies whose success depends on Patrick's policy decisions, creating systemic incentives for policy outcomes that may contradict public interest while benefiting specific commercial interests.

Blakemore's control over at least 10 legislators' campaign operations amplifies these conflicts exponentially. When someone lobbying for THC restrictions, sports betting opposition, and lottery contract reviews also manages the political survival of 26% of the Senate and a few House members, the distinction between lobbying and institutional control disappears. The legislators voting on Blakemore's client interests are the same legislators whose political careers depend on his campaign management services.

The Griffin family's institutional connections through the Texas Public Policy Foundation create an additional layer of potential coordination. With Don Dyer chairing TPPF's advocacy arm while Tim Dunn serves on the board, and Griffin's lobbying firm representing interests that align with TPPF's policy priorities, The Enterprise has multiple informal channels for coordination that operate outside traditional disclosure requirements. When Griffin's father-in-law sits on the same board as the billionaire funding Patrick's campaigns, while Griffin lobbies Patrick's office for clients whose interests align with both TPPF's agenda and Patrick's legislative priorities, the appearance of systematic coordination becomes difficult to dismiss.³³

The Systematic Capture of Texas Government

The Enterprise exemplifies how Texas's weak corruption laws enable sophisticated influence operations that operate within legal boundaries while subverting democratic accountability. The combination of unlimited campaign contributions, minimal lobbying enforcement, and dual consultant-lobbyist roles creates opportunities for systematic policy manipulation that benefits specific interests while contradicting overwhelming public support.

While criminal corruption charges would require evidence of explicit quid pro quo agreements, the documented patterns suggest a more subtle form of institutional capture. When consultants like Blakemore and Griffin can simultaneously direct a politician's campaign strategy while lobbying that same politician for clients whose interests directly conflict with public opinion, the system has failed regardless of whether specific laws were violated.

The scale of Blakemore's legislative control makes this institutional capture systematic. With at least 10 legislators depending on his firm for campaign operations—including 26% of the Texas Senate—Blakemore doesn't need to coordinate policy outcomes through traditional lobbying. He controls the political infrastructure that determines whether legislators survive electorally, creating inherent incentives for policy positions that benefit his lobbying clients.

The ultimate corruption may be not of law but of representation itself—a system where policy outcomes consistently favor consultant clients over constituent preferences, enabled by financial networks that make elected officials dependent on the same interests paying their advisors. In Texas, that system has multiple names: the Blakemore network, the Griffin operation, and the broader web of The Enterprise that puts corporate interests ahead of public will.